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Abstract 
What factors influence attitudes towards refugees? Do negative attitudes towards 
refugees also influence attitudes towards conflict in the host countries? Previous studies 
suggest that an influx of refugees, and locals’ reaction to them, may destabilize receiving 
countries and lead to conflict. In particular, actual or perceived negative effects of 
refugees’ presence, such as increased economic competition with the locals, disruption of 
ethnic balance in the host country, and arrival of people with ties to rebel groups may 
lead to an increased likelihood of civil conflict in countries that receive refugees. These 
effects can lead to instability by changing the locals’ incentives and opportunities of 
engaging in violence. Indeed, some studies find a positive correlation at the cross-
national level between influx of refugees and conflict in receiving countries. We 
contribute to this literature by experimentally manipulating information about the 
externalities of hosting refugees. We conducted a survey-experiment in the summer of 
2014 in Turkey, a country that hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees. We examine 
how different messages about the possible effects of hosting refugees—increased 
economic burden, disruption of ethnic balance, ties with rebels, as well as a positive 
message of saving innocent women and children—affect locals’ perceptions of the 
refugees and their attitudes towards the Turkish-Kurdish peace process. We find that 
some messages cause locals, especially majority non-Kurds, to hold more negative views 
of the refugees, and in some cases to view them as a threat. Yet on the whole, this 
information does not affect support for the peace process within Turkey. Rather, 
fundamental factors, such as partisanship, and previous exposure to conflict are better 
predictors of attitudes towards peace.  
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Introduction 
 
The number of refugees and displaced persons worldwide has surged to its highest levels 
since World War II due to several ongoing conflicts, and in particular, the Syrian Civil 
War (UNHCR, 2015: 2-3). Syrian refugees have fled primarily to neighboring countries, 
with the largest group of them residing in Turkey (UNHCR, 2015: 15). We study the 
attitudes and perceptions of the local population in Turkey towards Syrian refugees, and 
whether exposure to refugees affects the locals’ willingness to resolve conflicts in their 
own country to avoid escalation.  
 
Several factors are hypothesized to increase negative attitudes towards refugees: (1) 
competition over economic resources and social services (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001; 
Burns & Gimpel, 2000); (2) “disruption” of the host country’s ethnic balance and 
increase in intergroup tensions (Loescher & Milner, 2004); and (3) concerns that refugees 
may bring weapons, have connections to rebels, and experience in fighting that may fuel 
conflicts in the receiving country (Weiner, 1992-93). Importantly, locals’ perception of 
these factors, and not necessarily their objective impact, is argued to increase tensions in 
host countries (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006: 342-344). Several studies find a positive 
correlation between the arrival of refugees and the spread of conflict, but also 
acknowledge that such links may be confounded by, or conditioned on other factors, such 
as the ability to control the country’s borders and the incumbent government’s perceived 
legitimacy (Weiner, 1992-93; Whitaker, 2003). Other studies that use subnational data on 
refugees and conflict do not find that the arrival of refugees leads to more conflict in 
places where the refugees settle (Fisk, 2014; Shaver & Zhou, 2015). 
 
We contribute to this debate by exploring how messages about refugees influence the 
perceptions of refugees looking at the case of Syrian refugees in Turkey. We conducted a 
survey experiment in June and July of 2014 among 1,257 local residents in central, 
eastern, and southeastern Turkey. We randomly assigned respondents to different primes 
that reflect refugee-related messages (negative and positive). These primes are not only 
grounded in the literature on the effects of hosting refugees, but also reflect the Turkish 
media discourse about Syrian refugees. Thus, we also bring a note of realism into our 
study by manipulating information about refugees that is similar to elite discourse in 
Turkey. We examine the effect of these primes on attitudes towards refugees, and on 
support for the Turkish-Kurdish peace process.  
 
The effect of information on attitudes towards refugees and towards domestic conflict is 
important for several reasons. First, perceptions of refugees’ impact on the host country 
are one of the channels through which refugees may spread instability (Salehyan & 
Gleditsch, 2006: 342). We explicitly focus on messages that manipulate perceptions of 
the potential impacts of refugees on the host society. We do not examine whether the 
‘actual’ impact of refugees affects the likelihood of domestic conflict in Turkey. Second, 
attitudes towards conflict offer a lower bar to test for the negative effect of information 
about refugees on a host country. This is because actual violence may not accurately 
reflect latent attitudes as it is also conditioned on other factors, such as opportunity and 
resources. Additionally, while attitudes and behavior are not perfectly correlated, they are 
positively associated (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013), and attitude change can 
be used to predict future violence (Hirose, Imai & Lyall, 2016). 
 
We have five key findings. 1) Messages about negative effects of refugees lead to 
negative views about the refugees and their effects on Turkey, but primarily among non-
Kurdish (majority Turkish) respondents. This result is especially important because it 
shows that negative messages about mostly-Muslim refugees can negatively impact 
attitudes towards them even in a middle income, Muslim majority country such as 
Turkey. 2) There is some evidence of co-ethnic bias—Kurdish respondents exhibit more 
positive views towards Kurdish refugees than towards other refugees, and more than non-
Kurdish respondents. Sunni refugees are not as disliked as the other groups following our 
negative treatments. 3) Additionally, even though some of our primes negatively affect 
attitudes towards refugees (especially the message that refugees may be bringing arms), 
they do not lead the respondents to be less supportive of the Turkish-Kurdish peace 
process. This calls into question previous studies that argue that negative perceptions of 
refugees, and generally a higher salience of conflict, may increase support for violence 
(Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006; Kuran, 1998). 4) Locals who report high level of exposure 
to refugees in their daily life express more negative views of and higher threat 
perceptions of refugees. However, exposure to refugees does not change the effects of 
our treatments. 5) Finally, partisan identification matters: supporters of the governing 
party (AKP) are less likely to view the refugees as a threat. 
 
While information may induce negative attitudes towards refugees among some 
respondents, it does not appear to change attitudes towards domestic conflict. Instead 
these are shaped to a greater extent by geography and partisanship. Our study makes 
three important contributions. 1) We study a major host country (Turkey) that has 
received the largest number of Syrian refugees compared to other host countries.1 2) 
While much of the media and policy debates on Syrian refugees focus on their effects on 
Europe, the vast majority of refugees are hosted in surrounding countries, such as Turkey, 
Lebanon, and Jordan (Arar, Hintz & Norman, 2016). This pattern is not unique to the 
Syrian refugee crisis, as refugees from other civil wars also tend to flee primarily to 
neighboring countries (Moore & Shellman, 2007). 3) Finally, by examining the 
individual-level perceptions that are said to affect the locals’ response to refugees, we 
show that although anti-refugee appeals may have some traction, they do not increase 
support for conflict in the host country. 
 
We proceed first by providing background on Syrian refugees in Turkey, and on the main 
policy issue that coincided with their arrival—the Turkish-Kurdish peace process. We 
then review previous studies on the effect of refugees on their host countries, followed by 
a brief discussion of our survey design and sampling (a detailed description is in the 
Appendix), and present our findings. We conclude by outlining the implications of our 
study for understanding the impact of refugees on public attitudes of the locals. 
 
 
Background: Syrian refugees and Turkey 
 
In response to the arrival of first Syrian refugees in early 2011, Turkey opened several 
refugee camps to provide food, health care, and education. At the time of our survey, 22 
camps were operational in 10 provinces (see map in Figure A.1 in the Appendix). Despite 
these efforts, only 219,688 out of over 900,000 refugees in Turkey resided in camps 																																																								
1There were over 900,000 Syrian refugees in Turkey at the time of our survey, and nearly 3 million as of 
June 2017  (UNHCR, 2014). Although Turkey itself is a populous country, in some of the areas we survey, 
refugees constitute a significant portion of the local population (see Table A.1 in the Online Appendix). 
during our survey. The remaining refugees lived amongst the local population, primarily 
in provinces with camps (UNHCR, 2014). 
 
Relations between Syrian refugees and the local residents have been relatively peaceful.2 
Nonetheless, locals showed signs of discontent: some blamed the refugees for the 
increase in housing prices (Sak, 2014), the rise in unemployment, competition with local 
businesses (Çetingüleç, 2014), and even for social ills such as thefts, murders, smuggling, 
and prostitution (Erdoğan, 2015). 
 
Media coverage reflected those negative sentiments, but also contained positive 
depictions of refugees. We searched the archive of Hürriyet—a leading newspaper 
website—between April 2011 and June 2014 and found 112 articles directly related to 
Syrian refugees in Turkey.3 The most frequent negative theme is the possible connection 
between refugees and rebels (Hürriyet, 2012). Other articles highlight the economic 
burden of hosting the refugees, especially in border provinces (Hürriyet, 2014), and the 
refugees’ ethnic identity as a contributor to sectarian tensions. For instance, Alawite 
refugees are reluctant to reside in majority Sunni refugee camps (Yezdani, 2013). Finally, 
a number of articles highlight the positive humanitarian aspects of hosting refugees 
(Erkuş, 2014). This theme echoes messages of the AKP government, and the open-door 
policy and assistance to Syrian “brothers” fleeing from the violence of a cruel regime.4 
These different aspects of the refugee crisis form the basis of the treatments in our survey 
experiment. 
 
Turkish-Kurdish peace process 
 
At the time of our survey, one of the main issues at the forefront of Turkish domestic 
politics was the Turkish-Kurdish peace process—negotiations between the government 
and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to end a 30-year long conflict in exchange for 																																																								
2A notable exception is the Reyhanlı bombing in May 2013 that killed 52 people. Although responsibility 
and possible motives for the attack remain unclear (Daloğlu, 2014), some locals protested the presence of 
Syrians in Reyhanlı in the aftermath of the bombing, and many refugees fled the city (Deutsche Welle, 
2013; BBC, 2013). 
3The search results are available here: 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID=260&at=Refugees&ew=&om=&sd=4/1/2011&e
d=6/1/2014&so=0&a=-1&c=-1&uw=&pp=100&ot=0&sbmt=1 (accessed May 26, 2017). 
4See for instance, Australian Associated Press (2014) for Erdoğan’s statements. 
political reforms.5 The peace process began at the end of 2012 when the government 
announced negotiations with the jailed PKK leader Öcalan (Haberturk, 2012). Although 
the exact details of these talks are not fully known, the broad outlines of a potential deal 
included a ceasefire and withdrawal of the PKK, democratization, and PKK’s 
disarmament and normalization (Yeğen, 2015). 
 
Turkish public opinion in 2014 was divided with respect to these negotiations (Yılmaz, 
2014). While 57% supported the peace process, about 38% opposed it. Ethnicity and 
partisanship were the two strongest determinants of attitudes towards the peace process, 
with the Kurds and the AKP supporters being more in favor of this initiative than others. 
 
 
Attitudes towards refugees and the peace process 
 
Locals may harbor negative attitudes towards refugees for several reasons. For instance, 
they might be concerned that refugees alter the demographic balance in the host country 
(Loescher & Milner, 2004). This is especially true if refugees are ethnic kin to one of the 
aggrieved groups (for instance, the arrival of Kurdish refugees from Syria in Turkey). 
Locals may also mobilize into a “sons of the soil” movement if they feel that refugees 
threaten their long-standing status in their native regions (Weiner, 1992-93). For 
example, around the time of our survey, there were reports of tensions in Hatay between 
Turkish Alawites and Arab Sunni refugees from Syria,6 and concerns over the arrival of 
Sunni Arab refugees to the historically Kurdish areas (Çağaptay & Menekşe, 2014).7   
 
Besides fomenting negative attitudes, information about refugees may affect positions 
about conflict and cooperation in the host country. First, perceptions that refugees have 
connections to rebel groups may contribute to the locals’ sense of insecurity, not only 
making them more negative towards refugees, but also fueling existing conflicts, or 
spurring new disputes (Schweitzer et al., 2005; Lischer, 2005; Faulkner et al. 2004). For 																																																								
5 For a history of the Kurds, see McDowall (1996). For an in-depth analysis of the Kurdish question in 
Turkey, see Kirişçi & Winrow (1997). For a study of the PKK insurgency, see Marcus (2007). 6The Alawites in Hatay are ethnically and religiously related to the Syrian Arab Alawites, who are also 
referred to as Nusayris (Dressler, 2008; Nisan, 2002), and are fighting Arab Sunnis in Syria.   
7Two of the camp provinces--Mardin and Adıyaman--previously belonged to the state of emergency 
(OHAL) or OHAL-adjacent zones due to the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. 
example, Turkey’s assistance to Sunni Arab rebels and an “open-door” policy that 
brought many Sunni Arab refugees, some of whom were possibly connected to rebels 
(Hakan, 2012), may harden Kurdish negotiation positions. In this context, the Turkish-
Kurdish leader Demirtaş suggested that “developments in Syria might come to a stage to 
block the Kurdish peace process in Turkey” due to the government allowing support to 
flow from Turkey to radical Islamists in Syria, who are attacking Kurds there (Yetkin, 
2013). Moreover, Forsberg (2014) argues that when an ethnic group engages in an ethnic 
conflict in one country, it may encourage kin in neighboring countries to rebel as well. In 
this context, the fact that the Syrian Kurds play such a central role in the Syrian Civil War 
may encourage the Kurds in Turkey to harden their negotiation positions as well. Since 
refugees often settle along ethnic lines (Rüegger and Bohnet, 2012), exposure to Kurdish 
refugees coming from Syria may further lower their willingness to compromise with the 
Turkish government. In addition, the perception that refugees exacerbate economic 
competition may lead to conflicts between the locals and the refugees over jobs, housing, 
and public goods (Loescher & Milner, 2004; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). Indeed, rents 
in Gaziantep, an industrial city of 1.4 million people (around 300,000 of which are 
Syrians) doubled with the arrival of refugees. This has led to fights between locals and 
refugees, and anti-Syrian rallies in the city (Kütahyalı, 2014). Moreover, refugees’ arrival 
and the government’s integration policy may lead to conflict, or at least lower the locals’ 
willingness to compromise with each other, by augmenting the salience of ethnic-based 
grievances among the locals (Kuran, 1998). For instance, the Kurds may accuse the 
government of a ‘double standard’ for allowing Syrian refugees to receive education in 
Arabic while not permitting education in Kurdish in Turkish public schools (Kirişçi, 
2014: 25). The Kurds in Turkey have long demanded education in Kurdish language; 
with both Kurdish politicians and the PKK suggesting this should be part of the reforms 
agreed upon through the peace process negotiations (Yeğen, 2015: 13). Conversely, 
government assistance to refugees, and the fact that some of them are Kurdish and are 
more likely to settle among the Turkish Kurds (Rüegger & Bohnet, 2012) may predispose 
the latter to compromise with the government.  
 
Attitudes towards refugees and their effect on conflict are likely not uniform, with 
different parts of the local population taking different views. For instance, negative 
attitudes towards newcomers are often more prevalent among members of the ethnic 
majority who fear that their status may be threatened (Valentino, Suhay & Brader, 2008; 
Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). Common religion may also attenuate negative attitudes 
towards refugees. However, as Lazarev & Sharma (2017) show in the context of Syrian 
refugees in Turkey, economic concerns may trump the effects of shared identity. 
Residing in a place previously affected by political violence increases altruism (Gilligan, 
Pasquale & Samii, 2014), and may positively predispose respondents towards refugees, 
although in some cases members of such communities become more hawkish towards the 
outgroup (Getmansky & Zeitzoff, 2014). Partisan identification may also shape the 
locals’ position towards refugees. Indeed, AKP supporters in Turkey are more 
sympathetic towards Syrians (EDAM Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, 
2014). Lastly, political elites in host countries can play a decisive role in framing public 
opinion (Zaller, 1992; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). Ordinary citizens are often not 
well informed about refugees, so elites may try and inflame (or downplay) the perceived 
threat from newcomers as a way to increase their own political support (Gadarian & 
Albertson, 2014). 
 
In sum, primes about an influx of refugees may exacerbate negative attitudes toward 
refugees, particularly when emphasizing the negative externalities of hosting them (i.e., 
economic competition, disruption of ethnic balance, connection to militants). Whether 
negative perceptions of the refugees translate into lower support for the Turkish-Kurdish 
peace process is less clear. Negative primes may increase the salience of ethnicity, further 
exacerbating ethnic tensions, and reduce support for compromise between Turks and 
Kurds. Yet, ethnicity is also likely to moderate the effect of our primes about refugees 
given that Kurds and Turks have different economic status and reside in places with 
different exposure to past violence.  
 
 
Research design and data 
 
Sampling 
 
We employed a stratified sampling procedure to produce variation on three key factors 
associated with refugees and Turkish politics: refugee presence, past support for the 
incumbent party (AKP), and a history of Turkish-Kurdish violence. More detailed 
discussion of our sampling procedure is in the Appendix (section A.3). Figure 1 depicts 
our sample’s geographic distribution. Table A.2 in the Appendix lists the provinces, 
districts, and the number of respondents in each district.                                                               
                                                          
Figure 1 in here 
 
 
We surveyed 1,257 respondents, and our response rate was 34%.8 Our sample includes 
non-Kurds (58%) and Kurds (42%). Similarly to previous studies of public opinion in 
Turkey (Yılmaz, 2014; Kalaycıoglu, 2009; Kalaycıoğlu & Çarkoğlu, 2007; Çarkoğlu & 
Toprak, 2007), we classify someone as Kurdish if they list their first language as 
Kurdish.9 Sample demographics are shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 in here 
 
 
The Kurdish and non-Kurdish samples are well balanced on gender, age groups, AKP 
support, and residing in an urban district. 43% of Kurds in the sample live in provinces 
that were previously under state of emergency rule (OHAL) due to the Turkish-Kurdish 
conflict, whereas only 13% of non-Kurds lived in these provinces (see section A.3 in the 
Appendix for the list of these provinces). As we would expect from a marginalized 
minority, Kurds on average have lower household income, and are less likely to own 
some household goods. They are also slightly less educated than the non-Kurds. Kurds 
also appear to be more religious, as demonstrated in questions about alcohol use, 
frequency of prayer, and whether women in the family cover their hair. Finally, Kurds 
																																																								
8 American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) Response Rate 1 formula. 
9 Most Kurds, speak and understand Turkish as well as Kurdish. 97% of interviews were conducted in 
Turkish, and only 3% (43) in Kurdish. We also asked how much each respondent identifies him/herself as 
Turkish, Kurdish, and as a member of other minority groups. There is a strong correlation between listing 
Kurdish as the first language and identifying as a Kurd (ρ≈0.65). 
report slightly lower levels of refugee exposure in their daily lives except when it comes 
to seeing them on the streets.10  
 
Treatments 
 
We randomly assigned subjects to one of five experimental conditions (Table 2). In the 
Control condition, subjects did not receive any information about refugees. In the other 
four treatments, the enumerator read a brief statement heightening the refugees’ salience 
in Turkey, and then subjects received treatments (see section B.1 in the Appendix for the 
exact wording of our treatments). The Economic Cost, Ethnic Balance, and Militant Ties 
treatments were all meant to heighten a key negative aspect of hosting refugees. The 
Women and Children treatment was meant to balance out the negative tone of the 
treatments with a more positive tone, and to reflect AKP’s justification of its open-door 
policy towards the refugees. By including the positive prime, we can also see whether it 
is the negative aspects of hosting refugees, or simply mentioning refugees, that affects 
public opinion. We present randomization checks in section C in the Appendix.  
 
Table 2 in here 
 
 
Dependent variables 
 
Following the treatment, the enumerators asked subjects about their views on our main 
dependent variables: sympathy towards different groups of refugees,11 whether 
respondents view the refugees as an economic threat and as a threat to safety, and support 
for the Turkish-Kurdish peace process. The exact wording of specific items is in section 
B.2 of the Appendix. 
 
																																																								
10See section B.2 in the Appendix for the questions behind these variables.  
11To measure sympathy, we used feeling thermometer questions similar to those that have been previously 
used to measure sympathy towards political actors in public opinion surveys in Turkey. See e.g. Kennedy at 
al. (2011a); Kennedy et al. (2011b).   
Figure 2 shows the distribution of our dependent variables. We present the responses of 
Kurds and non-Kurds separately because group identification is an important cleavage in 
Turkey, and likely affects the way respondents view refugees (Valentino, Suhay & 
Brader, 2008; Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). Moreover, Kurds are the biggest minority 
group in Turkey, and the peace process concerns their welfare directly, especially in 
regions that we surveyed. There are noticeable differences between Kurds and non-
Kurds. The four upper panels of Figure 2 show that: (1) Kurdish respondents have 
warmer attitudes than non-Kurds towards all groups of refugees; (2) Kurdish respondents 
exhibit the warmest attitudes towards Kurdish refugees, and then towards Sunnis. Non-
Kurds express slightly warmer attitudes towards Sunni refugees, and treat the other 
groups equally. This suggests that common religion may be associated with a more 
sympathetic attitude towards refugees,12 but not as much as common ethnic identity. The 
four lower panels show that both Kurds and non-Kurds are concerned that refugees are 
making Turkey less safe, and that they pose an economic threat to Turkey. These views 
are slightly more prevalent among the non-Kurds than among the Kurds. Finally, the 
figure also suggests--similarly to other studies (Yılmaz, 2014)—that Kurds are more 
supportive of the peace negotiations than non-Kurds.  
 
Figure 2 in here 
 
 
Findings 
 
Empirical Strategy 
 
We are interested in how information about different externalities of hosting refugees 
(our treatments) affects the dependent variables while controlling for fundamental 
attributes—partisanship, refugee exposure, living in areas that experienced political 
violence, and ethnicity. Our empirical specification for individual i in province j is the 
following OLS model: 																																																								
12Most Turkish citizens---both Kurds and non-Kurds are Sunni.  
 
 
           Yij  = α1 × Ti + α2 × Kurdi + α3 × Kurdi  × Ti                                                    (1) 
                + β1 × AKPi + β2 × OHALj + β3 × Refugee Exposurei + γ × Xi + μj + εi 
 
where Yij  is the individual response to our dependent variables, Ti  is a vector of binary 
treatment indicators, Kurdi is a binary indicator of whether respondent i’s first language is 
Kurdish, AKPi is an AKP supporter binary indicator, OHALj is a binary variable equal 1 if 
individual i lives in an OHAL province.13 Refugee Exposurei is the individual (self-
reported) level of refugee exposure,14 and Xi is a vector of individual controls.15 The 
inclusion of these parameters allows us to investigate how individual-level ethnicity and 
party identity, as well as residing in an area of conflict, affect views of the refugees and 
their impact on Turkey. We control for other province-level covariates by including a 
province-level dummy μj. εi is a normally distributed error. We allow for differential 
treatment effects for Non-Kurds (α1) and Kurds (α1 + α3) based on our theoretical 
underpinnings that messages about refugees are likely to influence minorities and 
majorities differently. We are also interested in the effect of the key observational 
variables (β). 
 
Results 
 
We have three principal research questions. (1) Do the different primes about Syrian 
refugees change attitudes towards refugees relative to the Control? (2) How do they 
influence attitudes towards the Turkish-Kurdish peace process? (3) How do fundamental 
attributes—partisanship, refugee exposure, living in a place with past experience of 
violence, and ethnicity—influence attitudes towards refugees and domestic conflict? We 
																																																								
13Thus the interpretation of OHAL is the common variation explained by being in the OHAL, and the 
remaining individual province-level variation is explained by the province-level dummies. OHAL does not 
refer to individual-level exposure to past violence, but rather to residing in a community affected by 
violence in the past.   
14We discuss this measure in the Appendix, and show correlations between this variable and other variables 
in Table D.6. It is important to note that we also control for province fixed effects, so this individual 
measure is a more accurate measure of refugee exposure different from the common province-level 
variation.  
15It includes age, religiosity index, education, wealth index, sex, dummies for urban resident and for 
whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan (only 10% of the surveys were completed during 
Ramadan). Details about these variables are in section B.2 in the Appendix.  
present bootstrapped coefficient plots of the treatments and observational variables of 
interest in Figures 3-4. The full regression results are in Tables E.7-E.8 in the Appendix. 
All the dependent and independent variables (that are not dummy variables) are rescaled 
to lie between 0 and 1. In the Appendix, we show that our main results hold when we 
estimate our models using weighted regression.16 In addition, our results hold when we 
estimate the models without control variables (Tables F.11-F.12, and section F.2 in the 
Appendix), split the sample into non-Kurds vs. Kurds (Tables F.22-F.25 in the 
Appendix), and use an ordered probit model instead of OLS (Tables F.20-F.21 in the 
Appendix). We discuss additional robustness checks below.  
 
Attitudes towards refugees 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates that the Militant Ties and the Women and Children treatments 
make non-Kurds less likely to express positive attitudes towards refugees than non-Kurds 
in the control group. In particular, with respect to Arab, Alawite, and Kurdish refugees, 
these treatments lower the response of non-Kurds by 9 to 12 percentage points compared 
to the response of non-Kurds in the control group (with a 95% confidence interval of [1, 
20] using bootstrap standard errors). 
 
Figure 3 in here 
 
 
Whereas the negative effect of Militant Ties treatment is intuitive, the result with respect 
to Women and Children is surprising. One might expect that reminding the respondents 
that many refugees are innocent women and children would increase positive attitudes 
towards them. We believe that this negative effect is driven by the fact that over 75% of 
the refugee population in 2014 was women and children (UNHCR, 2014), and the 
perception that women and children are unproductive populations that would continue to 
require support in the future.17 Orhan & Gündoğar (2015) provide support for this 
interpretation, and find that seeing Syrian children begging on the streets in Turkey 																																																								
16See Tables F.18-F.19 in the Appendix, and they indicate that it is not simply the extra efficiency gained 
by our stratified sampling which is driving the results.  
17For an illustration of the negative perception of women and children, see Evin (2015).  
increases the negative perception of refugees amongst the locals. An additional factor that 
may contribute to the negative effect of the Women and Children prime are reports 
around the time of the survey that local men are marrying Syrian refugee brides as second 
or third wives. Erdoğan (2015) reports that instances of polygamy and child marriages 
involving Syrian refugees generate discontent amongst the locals towards young Syrian 
females. The increase in divorce rates has also been blamed on marriages between 
Turkish men and Syrian women (Orhan & Gündoğar, 2015). Thus a seemingly positive 
treatment about saving Syrian women and children may have also reminded respondents 
of specific demographic-related, negative externalities that come with hosting young 
women and children refugees. 
 
Our treatments do not influence the attitudes of Kurds towards the refugees, with the 
exception of the Economic Cost treatment, which leads Kurdish respondents to express 
more positive attitudes towards Kurdish refugees (not towards other refugees), compared 
to Kurds that do not receive such treatment (significant only at 90% level (p-value is 
.06)). We interpret this as weak evidence of co-ethnic bias in treatment of refugees, 
especially when Kurdish respondents are informed that the Turkish government is 
spending resources on refugees who also include members of their own ethnic group, the 
Syrian Kurds.18  
 
The Militant Ties treatment has no significant effect on Kurds’ attitudes towards 
refugees. This may be partially because Kurds in Turkey have sympathies for the Syrian 
Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, Popular Defense Units 
(YPG), most of whose recruits are also Kurdish (Paasche, 2015). Therefore, the Kurds in 
our sample may have interpreted the refugees having ties to armed groups not necessarily 
as a negative development. However, this account fails to explain why the Kurds do not 
show negative attitudes towards other groups of refugees, such as Arab refugees, when 
they receive the Militant Ties treatment. 
 
Finally, attitudes towards Sunni refugees are not influenced by our treatments. The only 
exception is the Women and Children treatment that makes non-Kurds more negative 																																																								
18An alternate view is that the Economic Cost treatment signals to Kurds that the Turkish government is 
helping refugees, some of whom are Syrian Kurds, and thus it is more acceptable to express pro-Kurdish 
views.  
towards Sunnis, but this result is significant only at 90% level. Following all other 
treatments, respondents become neither negative nor positive towards Sunni refugees 
compared to the control group. This is consistent with Lazarev & Sharma (2017), who 
also find that shared religion is not a strong determinant of pro-refugees attitudes. 
 
Among the non-experimental variables, living in provinces previously under OHAL 
(provinces that experienced political violence due to the Turkish-Kurdish conflict) is 
strongly associated with more positive attitudes towards all groups of refugees. Self-
reported daily exposure to refugees (Refugee Exposure) is not associated with negative 
attitudes towards refugees (in the case of Arab and Alawite refugees, it is associated with 
more positive attitudes towards these groups, and these results are significant at 90% and 
99% levels, respectively). This is contrary to the arguments that contact with refugees is 
likely to foment xenophobic sentiments among the locals. Finally, partisanship (AKP) is 
not a significant determinant of respondents’ attitudes towards refugees. AKP supporters 
are somewhat positive towards Sunnis, but this result is marginally significant (90%).  
 
In sum, our results suggest that 1) primes related to possible military ties of the refugees, 
as well as the arrival of women and children negatively affect attitudes towards the 
refugees; and 2) these primes affect non-Kurds that receive these treatments relative to 
non-Kurds in the control group, and do not affect Kurds (ethnic minority). Finally 3) 
residing in a province with a history of violence (OHAL) is associated with warmer 
feelings towards refugees. As a robustness check, we show in the Appendix that the 
differences between Kurds and non-Kurds are not due to the fact that the Kurds are less 
exposed to Syrian refugees in their daily life. 
 
Refugees as a threat 
 
In the upper panel of Figure 4, we observe a similar pattern of negative attitudes towards 
refugees among the non-Kurdish respondents. Following the Women and Children 
treatment, non-Kurdish respondents are 9 percentage points more likely to view the 
refugees as an economic threat, compared to non-Kurdish respondents in the control 
group (95% confidence interval of [0.4, 17]). The same treatment causes the non-Kurds 
to be 8 percentage points more likely to agree that refugees are making Turkey less safe 
compared to non-Kurds in the control group (95% confidence interval of [0.1, 17]). Non-
Kurds are also 9 percentage points more likely to say that refugees are a safety threat 
following the Militant Ties treatment compared to non-Kurds in the control group (95% 
confidence interval [0.4, 17]). Kurdish respondents are not more likely to view refugees 
as an economic or a safety threat following the Militant Ties treatment. Similar to our 
explanation for the Militant Ties treatment not affecting Kurds’ attitudes towards Kurdish 
refugees, this result can be explained by the fact that Kurds in Turkey sympathize with, 
or at least are less threatened by the PYD and its armed wing, the YPG. Therefore, Kurds 
in our sample may have interpreted the refugees having ties to armed groups not 
necessarily as a threat. 
 
Figure 4 in here 
 
 
The non-experimental variables also exert a strong effect on attitudes towards refugees. 
AKP Supporters are significantly less likely to view refugees as a threat, in line with the 
AKP platform. Respondents from OHAL provinces are not particularly threatened by the 
refugees. There is even some indication that they have lower perception of economic 
threat, though it is significant only at 90% level. Conversely, higher self-reported 
exposure to refugees (Refugee Exposure) is associated with a heightened threat 
perception. 43% of the Kurds in our sample live in former OHAL provinces,19 and the 
primes do not increase Kurds’ negative feelings towards the refugees. Taken together, 
these two points strongly suggest that Kurds are more welcoming and less threatened by 
the refugees than non-Kurds. In the robustness checks section, we demonstrate that this 
result is not due to their lower exposure to refugees. 
 
Refugee primes and attitudes towards peace 
 
In the lower panel of Figure 4, we look at the effect of the experimental primes and the 
key non-experimental variables on support for the peace process. We chose to focus on 
the peace process because our goal is to examine whether refugees affect attitudes 																																																								
19Also, 71% of our sample that is in former OHAL provinces is Kurdish.  
towards domestic conflict; and the PKK insurgency, and the efforts to end the insurgency 
through peaceful means was the main issue of domestic conflict in Turkey at the time of 
our survey. 
 
The only treatment that has a significant effect is the Economic Cost treatment for the 
Kurds on support for the peace process. Specifically, there is an increase of 12 percentage 
points in support for the peace process among Kurds in Economic Cost group compared 
to Kurds in the control group, with 95% confidence interval of [5,20] using bootstrap 
standard errors. Apart from this, our treatments do not affect respondents’ view on the 
peace process. 
 
For the non-experimental variables, AKP Supporters are more supportive of the peace 
process, reflecting a strong partisan effect on political attitudes. Other non-experimental 
variables are not statistically significant, except for respondents in former OHAL 
provinces who are more supportive of the peace process but this effect is significant only 
at the 90% level. This finding is not surprising because this region suffered the most from 
the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, and the majority of the respondents from former OHAL 
provinces are Kurdish (71%). Overall, these results show that partisanship has the 
strongest effect on the respondents’ positions on domestic conflict while the treatments 
do not have significant effects except the Economic Cost treatment on the Kurds’ support 
for peace process. One explanation of this finding is that Kurds, hearing that the 
government is spending resources on helping the refugees who also include their ethnic 
kin (Syrian Kurds), become more in favor of the peace process, which aims at expanding 
the political rights of the Kurds in Turkey. 
 
Robustness Checks 
 
So far we find that Kurds and non-Kurds respond differently to our treatments: Kurds do 
not express negative attitudes towards refugees, do not view refugees as a threat, and 
become more supportive of the peace process. There are two alternative explanations for 
this finding: 1) Kurds are less likely to interact with refugees in their daily lives 
compared to non-Kurds. Indeed, Kurds are more likely to reside in the OHAL region, 
where the reported exposure to refugees is lower; and 2) Kurds as members of a minority 
group may provide favorable answers to sensitive political questions. 
 
To explore the first possibility—that Kurds’ answers are driven by their low exposure to 
refugees—we repeat our tests using data on provinces with camps where refugee 
exposure is higher.20 We explore this in Tables F.13 and F.14, and section F.3 in the 
Appendix. Our main results hold. Even if we focus only on provinces with camps, where 
exposure to refugees is higher, Kurds still do not express negative attitudes towards 
refugees, view them as a threat or become less supportive of the peace process. 
 
It is also possible that Kurds do not express their ‘true’ views, but instead, as an ethnic 
minority, provide socially desirable answers. To explore this possibility, we also asked 
the respondents to what extent they identify with Turkey. This question is sensitive in the 
Turkish context (Şirin, 2013: 81), and to the extent that social desirability is an issue, we 
expect it to be evident in this question. Specifically, if the Kurdish respondents express 
“politically-correct” views, then the variable Kurd should have no association with the 
level of identification with Turkey. However, the Kurds in our sample are less likely to 
identify strongly with Turkey than the non-Kurds, which suggests that they do not 
necessarily provide socially desirable answers. Results are in Table F.15 in the Appendix. 
 
One of our strongest findings is that respondents from provinces with a history of 
violence (OHAL) have warmer attitudes towards the refugees. To examine whether we 
observe the same relationship with a more nuanced measure of political violence at the 
province-level, we estimate our models using the province-level PKK fatalities data in 
Tezcür (2015).21 Similar to the results with the OHAL dummy, the results show that 
respondents from provinces with larger number of PKK fatalities have warmer attitudes 
towards refugees, and are more favorable to the peace process.  
 																																																								
20Respondents from provinces with camps report higher levels of exposure to refugees (difference=0.11 
and t=5.81 and p<0.00002). This suggests that our sampling strategy indeed accounted for individual 
exposure to Syrian refugees; and that respondents were likely to be truthful about their level of interactions 
with Syrian refugees. 
21Because the province-level PKK fatalities data are collinear with the province dummies, we drop the 
dummies in these regressions but include a dummy variable for camp province, and the log of district 
distance to the border -- two variables that can potentially affect public attitudes towards refugees and the 
peace process. See Tables F.9 and F.10 in the Appendix.  
An additional concern may be that response rates vary systematically, and that refusal to 
participate in the survey is higher in the former OHAL region. In fact, refusal rates are 
slightly lower in OHAL provinces (p<0.01). This strongly suggests that our results are 
not driven by respondents from areas with past conflict refusing to participate.  
 
Finally, a critique may be that our experimental findings would be different if we 
conducted the survey today, with nearly 3 million refugees currently residing in Turkey 
(as of June 2017). Two of our results provide some clues, and suggest that the 
experimental results would not be so different. First, we explicitly studied areas in 
Turkey’s southeast, some of which were already experiencing significant refugee 
presence. Importantly, as we show in the Appendix (Tables F.16-F.17), exposure to 
refugees does not moderate the effects of our treatments, so those with high levels of 
daily exposure to refugees do not respond differently to our treatments relative to those 
who have lower refugee exposure. This suggests that additional influx of refugees should 
not change our experimental findings.  
 
 
Summary and implications 
 
We examine how messages about Syrian refugees affect attitudes of local residents in 
Turkey towards refugees and towards the Turkish-Kurdish peace process. We show that 
priming commonly hypothesized negative effects of refugees (especially Militant Ties), 
as well as a positive prime (Women and Children) increases negative attitudes towards 
refugees and threat perceptions among members of majority group (Non-Kurds). Yet 
these primes do not lower support for the Turkish-Kurdish peace process. Conversely, for 
Kurds, the Economic Cost treatment actually makes them more supportive of the peace 
process. 
 
The non-experimental variables also provide several interesting findings. Supporters of 
the ruling AKP party are not fonder of the refugees compared to supporters of other 
parties, but they are systematically less likely to see refugees as a threat. There is strong 
evidence that residing in a province with a history of political violence (OHAL) is 
associated with more positive feelings towards refugees and greater support for the peace 
process. This is consistent with previous findings that community-level experience with 
political violence is associated with an increase in altruistic attitudes.  
 
This is not to say that refugees do not have negative externalities, and that emphasizing 
these externalities does not heighten negative attitudes towards refugees.22 Yet we show 
that in the context of one of the largest refugee crises, and against an ethnically tense 
backdrop (Turkey-PKK conflict), locals’ political attitudes are not as malleable as many 
hypothesize. While information about refugees may affect perception of refugees among 
some respondents, it does not affect support for the peace process. Rather preexisting 
factors (partisanship and place of residence) shape attitudes towards peace. 
 
It is also important to highlight that the finding that primes change attitudes, but not 
policy preferences is in line with other survey experiments that find similar effects of 
information (Kuziemko et al., 2015). Relatedly, Grigorieff, Roth & Ubfal (2016) 
demonstrate that while information about immigrants affects the locals’ attitudes towards 
them, it has a limited effect on immigration policy preferences of the local respondents. 
In our case, we provide information about possible externalities of hosting refugees from 
a civil war in a neighboring country, thereby increasing the salience of the negative 
effects of civil conflict. We show that some of this information moves attitudes towards 
refugees and even threat perception, but has no effect on policy preferences related to 
solving a domestic conflict. 
 
One concern might be that the recent ethnic tensions between Kurdish groups and the 
Turkish government potentially call into question our findings that refugees do not 
necessarily heighten local tensions. For instance, a Kurd from Turkey, who received 
training in the Islamic State camps in Syria, perpetrated a suicide attack in the border 
town of Suruç in Turkey that killed 32 individuals and triggered the collapse of the peace 
process (BBC, 2015). Hence, this attack might be considered as evidence for the 
transnational rebel networks mechanism identified in the literature. However, the recent 
round of violence in Turkey seems to have more to do with electoral dynamics (İdiz, 
2015), or foreign policy related to the Syrian civil war (Çağaptay, 2015), rather than the 
influx of refugees. Moreover, an equally plausible, alternative interpretation of the Suruç 																																																								
22After all, we find that respondents who report high self exposure to refugees also have a heightened threat 
perception.  
attack is that Turkey’s open-door policy was the cause of both the large Syrian refugee 
flows as well as the higher chances of armed conflict in Turkey.  
 
It is also important to acknowledge that some features of Turkey may set it apart from 
other recipients of Syrian refugees, especially the European countries. In particular, 
Turkey is a predominantly Sunni-Muslim country hosting mostly Sunni refugees, and the 
effect of refugee-related messages on the locals may differ if there are religious 
differences between the locals and the refugees. Yet it is also the case that most refugees 
flee to neighboring countries that tend to be similar to their country of origin.  
 
Finally, our findings have important policy implications. Many NGOs and governments 
seek to reduce the locals’ anxiety and promote positive views of the refugees.23 However, 
we show that emphasizing positive messages featuring women and children refugees 
does not necessarily make the locals more supportive of the refugees, and can actually 
backfire, depending on how these messages are interpreted by the locals. Another 
implication that emerges from our finding is that information that the refugees may have 
weapons and ties with militant groups has a particularly strong effect on attitudes and 
threat perception of the locals. Thus, addressing these concerns and reassuring the local 
population that refugees are not a threat should be an important priority. 
 
Replication data 
 
The dataset and the do-file for the empirical analysis can be found at 
http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets/. 
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Table I. Sample demographics 
 Non-Kurds Kurds 
Variable N Mean Std. 
dev. 
Min Max N Mean Std. 
dev. 
Min Max 
Female 716 0.50 0.50 0 1 526 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Age group 716 2.43 1.10 1 4 526 2.44 1.09 1 4 
Married 715 0.70 0.46 0 1 524 0.76 0.43 0 1 
AKP supporter 681 0.50 0.50 0 1 479 0.51 0.50 0 1 
OHAL 716 0.13 0.33 0 1 526 0.43 0.50 0 1 
Urban district 716 0.72 0.45 0 1 526 0.75 0.44 0 1 
Ramadan survey 716 0.12 0.32 0 1 526 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Education 716 3.99 1.42 1 8 524 3.45 1.65 1 8 
Household income 697 5.50 2.87 1 16 487 4.21 2.12 1 16 
Components of wealth 
Smart phone 716 0.33 0.47 0 1 526 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Car 716 0.31 0.46 0 1 526 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Computer 716 0.51 0.50 0 1 526 0.25 0.44 0 1 
Washing machine 716 0.93 0.26 0 1 526 0.89 0.31 0 1 
Dish washer 716 0.65 0.48 0 1 526 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Components of religious 
Cover hair 702 5.00 1.96 1 7 518 6.19 1.51 1 7 
Alcohol not OK 709 4.35 2.30 1 7 524 4.72 2.64 1 7 
Pray 682 3.88 2.03 1 7 512 5.03 1.56 1 7 
Components of self-reported refugee exposure 
Public transport 708 0.67 0.37 0 1 503 0.50 0.42 0 1 
Street 707 0.64 0.37 0 1 502 0.69 0.36 0 1 
Business 706 0.28 0.40 0 1 499 0.23 0.38 0 1 
Social life 702 0.47 0.42 0 1 495 0.36 0.40 0 1 
Market 702 0.62 0.38 0 1 503 0.56 0.40 0 1 
†Wealth, religious, and refugee exposure are factor variables created using the components listed 
below each item. The differences in the number of respondents are due to missing values.  
 
Table II. Experimental conditions 
Treatment View on refugees Description 
Control ---  
Economic cost Negative Syrian refugees impose 
large costs on government 
resources, and increase 
unemployment among 
Turkish citizens. 
Ethnic balance Negative Syrian refugees upset 
Turkey’s ethnic balance. 
Militant ties Negative Syrian refugees have ties to 
militant groups that make 
Turkey less safe. 
Women and children Positive Turkey’s refugee policy has 
saved many innocent 
women and children. 																																
			
Figure 1. Map of the sampled districts 
 
The white areas represent our sampling frame, and the districts with dark borders are those where 
our survey took place. As the map and the strata legend show, our survey experiment involved 
respondents from a diverse set of districts--close to and far from the border; high, medium, and 
low level of refugee presence; high and low support for the incumbent; and high and low 
exposure to past violence due to the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. The definitions of high, medium, 
and low are in section A.3 in the Appendix. 																				
			
Figure 2. Responses to the main dependent variables questions – Kurdish / Non-Kurdish 
respondents comparison 
 
The top four panels present the distribution of respondents’ feelings towards particular groups of 
refugees on a scale from 1 (very cold feelings) to 7 (very warm feelings). The following three 
panels depict the distribution of respondents’ agreement with the statements that refugees pose an 
economic threat / make Turkey less safe, and respondents’ willingness to sign a petition in 
support of the peace process (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree).  																	
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Figure 3. Positive attitudes towards different groups of Syrian refugees 
 
These figures depict the marginal effect of our treatments and several observational variables on 
attitudes of Kurdish and non-Kurdish respondents towards Arab, Alawite, Kurdish, and Sunni 
refugees. Negative values imply that respondents feel cold (negative) towards the refugees, and 
positive values suggest warm (positive) feelings. We present 95 % confidence intervals. 			
			
Figure 4. Refugee primes, threat perceptions, and support for the Turkish-Kurdish peace 
process 	
These figures depict the marginal effect of our treatments and several observational controls on 
Kurdish and non-Kurdish respondents’ threat perception and willingness to support the peace 
process. In the two upper panels, negative values imply that respondents feel less threatened, and 
positive values suggest they feel more threatened. In the bottom plot, negative values mean 
respondents are less willing to support the peace process, and positive values mean they are more 
willing to do it. We present 95 % confidence intervals. 
